




Does Service Bundling Reduce Churn? 
 
 










We examine whether bundling in telecommunications services reduces churn using a series of 
large, independent cross sections of household decisions. To identify the effect of bundling, we 
construct a pseudo-panel dataset and utilize a linear, dynamic panel-data model, supplemented 
by nearest-neighbor matching. We find bundling does reduce churn for all three “triple-play” 
services. However, the effect is only “visible” during times of turbulent demand. We also find 
evidence that broadband was substituting for pay television in 2009. This analysis highlights that 
bundling helps with customer retention in service industries, and may play an important role in 
preserving contracting markets.  
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  A firm engages in bundling when it sells two or more separate products in a package for a 
single price. Bundling is pervasive in many markets. In this paper we study bundling of wired 
telephone, cable television,  and broadband Internet  services  by cable operators, often called 
“triple play.” Virtually every major cable television firm in the United States offers triple play, 
and many households subscribe to it.  
  The way in which cable firms offer triple-play bundling is different from other examples 
that have been studied. In particular, cable firms offer services, not products. The recurring 
nature of services allows bundling to play two distinct roles—either to attract new users to a 
firm’s service, or to prevent existing users from leaving. In a one-time purchase of bundled 
services, such as a movie, there is no reason to distinguish between these two roles, as the latter 
role is irrelevant. In cable services, however, users may go years with the same supplier before 
reconsidering their arrangement. It is quite natural to focus on the importance of bundling for 
delaying those moments of reconsideration, which can result in a buyer changing suppliers. That 
motivates this paper’s key question: does bundling reduce churn, and if so, how much? 
More specifically, this study examines whether bundles reduced churn for cable services 
between 2007 and 2009, when offering triple play became pervasive at virtually every cable firm 
in the United States. We define churn as the abandonment of a service or service provider by an 
existing user, a household. In this study, we reasoned that if bundling reduces churn, then it 
causes households to be less likely to switch services (and/or service providers) once they have 
purchased a bundle. We measured churn for wired telephone, pay television (cable or satellite), 
and broadband Internet, as well as provision of these services by cable companies, employing a 
rich consumer marketing dataset provided by Forrester Research. 
A recent survey by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) provides suggestive 
evidence of this role of bundling, as nearly 40 percent of respondents noted that having to change 
their bundle was a major reason for keeping their broadband service. That survey’s statistics 
indicate one of the key issues we confront: bundling may reduce churn by altering the cost of 
switching (i.e., state dependence). Such switching costs are far less explicit (and perhaps even 
less deliberate) than those created by customers signing a contract (e.g., as with many cell phone-




inconvenience experienced by bundling households upon switching a service, as they must 
restructure their entire telecommunications service portfolio by dismantling their bundle. 
  Beyond the FCC study, a long-standing debate about the effects of bundling motivates 
our analysis. Some would argue that bundling generates “stickiness,” which potentially reflects 
consumer preferences and benefits producers by reducing the frequency of switching. Others 
would argue that bundling creates switching costs, which enhances firms’ market power and 
ultimately comes at the expense of consumer welfare. While each side essentially takes 
bundling’s causal effect on churn as a fact, to our knowledge there is no empirical evidence 
about bundling’s effect and its magnitude in this respect. In addition to providing evidence of 
bundling’s effect, our paper contributes to this debate by disentangling bundling’s casual effect 
from other factors spuriously correlated with churn. 
In addition to any effect on churn, bundling may also screen inert consumers (unobserved 
heterogeneity), identifying consumers who are inherently least likely to switch to another 
supplier. If this is occurring, bundling does not cause churn reduction, but rather identifies 
households less likely to churn. This is a key issue for our empirical analysis, which examines a 
much larger and richer dataset than the FCC survey. 
The data for this study come from Forrester and consist of tens of thousands of surveys of 
American households. Though rich in detail about users, the data are not a panel of the same 
households, but only a series of independent, repeated cross sections. This makes it impossible 
for us to observe the state (e.g., bundle status in 2007) and choice (e.g., broadband service in 
2008) for the same household, which is how most common theories are framed. To overcome 
this limitation, we build a pseudo (or synthetic) panel and utilize a linear, dynamic-panel data 
model, following known econometric techniques, e.g., Moffitt (1993) and Verbeek and Vella 
(2005). We supplement these methods on some occasions, employing nearest-neighbor matching 
methods described in Abadie et al. (2004). Our general approach is novel for the literature on 
bundling, and, to our knowledge, the latter extension is also novel in the econometric literature. 
Most of the existing literature on bundling is theoretical, and addresses a wide array of potential 
competitive issues when users face switching costs (e.g., Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). This 
paper focuses on empirically examining one of the key premises and implicit predictions of most 




prediction is quite pervasive in the literature. It arises in models where users are forward looking 
and demand price discounts, or where they are not and find themselves facing an unexpected cost 
when they attempt to switch suppliers. 
  Prior literature has established several reasons why firms may wish to bundle, which have 
clear links to churn reduction. Many papers examined the use of bundling as a means to leverage 
market power. This may occur through exclusionary practices (Whinston, 1990) or reduction of 
competition through differentiation (Carbajo et al., 1990; Chen, 1997).  Prior  work  has also 
examined bundling as a means to (second degree) price discriminate. Specifically, bundling can 
be used to reduce heterogeneity in consumers’ valuations, allowing a firm with market power to 
extract more surplus from consumers (Adams and Yellen, 1976; Schmalensee, 1982; McAfee et 
al., 1989; Stole, 2003; Crawford, 2008). This has clear detrimental effects on consumer welfare 
when it involves consumers purchasing products of little or no interest to them (Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson, 1999; Armstrong, 1996).
1
These explanations overlap with  some of the behavior we observe.  For example, 
discounting for new users is common in this industry. However, we have reason to believe that 
many common explanations, such as those linked to exploiting market power, may not explain 
bundling motivations for the firms we study.  During our period of study, cable firms were 
engaged in mixed bundling, which allows consumers to make a la carte purchases. Offering such 
bundles would severely hamper or nullify attempts to price discriminate or leverage market 
power via bundle offerings. 
 The welfare effects are close to neutral, however, if 
users anticipate the later surplus reduction, and receive advanced discounts at the moment they 
sign up for the bundle (Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). 
If triple-play bundling does reduce churn, communications and broadcasting markets 
could be impacted in several ways. First, as noted above, it could enhance market power both in 
the short and long run. In the short run, consumers’ lessened willingness to switch would allow 
firms to sustain higher prices, ceteris paribus, but forward-looking consumers demanding 
discounts up front may mitigate this effect. In the long run, increased switching costs may help 
                                                           
1 The literature provides several other motivations for firms to bundle. A non-exhaustive list includes entry 
deterrence (Nalebuff, 1999); dynamic gains through increased R&D incentives (Choi, 1998); cost savings (Salinger, 




deter entry, as potential competitors would find luring new customers away from their current 
service provider more difficult. In addition, it could help prevent important markets from 
contracting. Specifically, our data highlight recent contractions in both the wired telephone and 
pay-television markets. Triple-play bundles may offer a way for cable firms, and other firms 
capable of offering a telecommunications bundle, to try to preserve the size of these markets. 
We found that bundling does reduce churn for the three services in a triple-play bundle. 
As we might have expected, the effect was most pronounced for adoption of these services from 
the cable company (as compared to adoption overall). We also stressed an important empirical 
effect in our data that has received little attention in the theoretical literature. The effect was only 
evident in our data when services experienced “turmoil” in the form of significant diffusion 
(broadband) or contraction (wired telephone and pay television in 2009, due to recession). The 
pronounced effects during market contractions highlight bundling’s potential role in helping 
mitigate shrinking markets. 
We also found suggestive evidence of broader demand factors shaping bundling’s effects, 
which  also  lay  outside the scope of existing theory. There was  a  feedback effect through 
television on broadband in 2009, as many households shifted from having television and 
broadband to just having broadband.  This shift indicated that  more households viewed 
broadband as a substitute for television, and implied  a smaller net effect of bundling on 
broadband churn, because bundlers are less likely to churn television and thus have less need of 
broadband as a substitute. 
Finally, while our econometric techniques were designed to identify the causal (state-
dependent) effect of bundling on churn, we recognize that they could serve as a screen as well. 
Consequently, we tested for screening in supplemental analysis, using only suggestive, non-
definitive tests. We found that bundlers tend to have lower income and education levels, as 
compared to non-bundlers who also purchased all three services. While not conclusive, these 
differences suggest that bundlers are a selected sample of households, and therefore may differ 
on other relevant dimensions, including propensity to switch at a later time. However, we also 
found that controlling for heavy cell-phone use and online-content consumption, which helps 
predict churn in wired telephone and pay television respectively, had  little impact on our 




identifying potential service churners, bundlers are not a particularly selected sample along these 
dimensions.  Hence,  bundling has an effect on churn that is separate from these household 
behaviors. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss bundling in 
the telecommunications industry. In Section 3, we present a simple model of household demand 
for telecommunications services and service providers. In Section 4, we describe our data, and in 
Section 5, we detail our econometric models. In Section 6, we present our results, and in Section 
7, we provide conclusions. 
 
2. Bundling in cable services 
As cable firms began offering more services than just cable television, they began 
experimenting with bundling the triple-play services: wired telephone, pay television, and 
broadband Internet. While we don’t have an official date as to when this practice began, the data 
we possess only began asking households about bundling behavior in 2006, and at that time well 
under 15 percent of households in our data were participating.
2
In general, local cable companies have been able to provide all three services, sometimes 
at a competitive advantage. This is entirely due to technology differences between these 
companies and their competitors, e.g., local telephone companies and satellite providers of 
television services. While cable companies have the infrastructure to provide television, as well 
as Internet and phone over cable lines, satellite companies are limited in their ability to provide 
high-speed Internet and telephone services, and local telephone companies have generally been 
limited in their ability to provide television service (and also provide a slower version of high-
speed Internet in the form of DSL). One notable change to this scenario has been Verizon’s 
rollout of fiber optics, allowing it to provide television service, called FiOS, and faster Internet 
connections. However, this rollout has been slower than predicted, and our data indicate that well 
under 5 percent of households subscribed to FiOS even by the end of 2009. 
    
                                                           
2 This is consistent with other survey data about bundling. In their study of prices for U.S. broadband services, 
Greenstein and McDevitt (2011) did not begin their price index for bundled services until 2006, the first year when 




Following the prior literature, we distinguish between pure and mixed bundling. 
Examples of pure bundling are the bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows, as well as cable 
channel bundling. Consumers are only given the option of buying the bundles or nothing at all. 
In contrast, mixed bundling combines wired telephone, pay television, and broadband Internet. In 
addition to purchasing the bundle, consumers have the option of buying any subset of services 
instead. Further, the observed pricing of individual services is such that some consumers will 
make this choice.
3
  Why would cable companies want to offer triple-play bundles? As mentioned in the 
introduction, there are several standard explanations. Bundling may be an attempt to extend 
market power; however, the mixed nature of the bundle mitigates this possibility. In addition, 
bundling could be an attempt at price discrimination; however, it seems intuitive that demand for 
these technology services would be positively correlated (e.g., because income is a strong 
determinant of demand for any of them).
 
4
  Some key features of triple-play bundling by cable firms make it different from other 
examples that have been studied, both broadly, as noted, and in communications regulatory 
settings.
 The mixed nature also mitigates this possibility. 
Bundling also may occur because there are economies of scope in production or companies want 
to simplify the choice set for consumers. 
5
                                                           
3 This last feature highlights that the practice truly is mixed bundling, rather than pure bundling disguised as mixed 
bundling (i.e., if à la carte prices were so high that no one would choose them, then the firms are de facto pure 
bundling). As noted in Stremersch and Tellis (2002), the fact that firms are engaged in mixed, and not pure, 
bundling should effectively protect them from any antitrust scrutiny. 
 This novelty requires a new explanation for why firms may want to bundle their 
products. In particular, cable firms offer services, not products. While much, if not all, of the 
theoretical work on bundled products can include services, or be easily extended to services, the 
recurring nature of triple-play services allows for bundling to serve a specific purpose. It may 
lead to bundling playing two distinct roles—either to attract new users or to prevent existing 
4 In a paper that helped inspire this work, Gandal et al. (2011) empirically shows positively correlated preferences 
for word processors and spreadsheets. 
5 For example, there has been a long-standing controversy about whether some local telephone firms did or did not 
offer a full array of mixed bundles in broadband and voice telephone markets, and whether consumers would benefit 
if they did. This controversy focused on whether consumers could get DSL service without also subscribing to 
phone service, so-called “naked DSL.” See e.g., http://www.cybertelecom.org/broadband/dslnaked.htm. Our 




users from leaving. In cable services, users may go for years with the same supplier before 
reconsidering their arrangement. 
We hypothesize that bundling can increase the switching costs of consumers considering 
an alternative provider or dropping a service, both by forcing a household to restructure its entire 
telecommunications portfolio when switching and to lose the simplification that comes from 
having all the services on one bill. For this reason, bundling may have a causal effect on service 
renewal rates, i.e., households who bundle may be less likely to “churn” their services and/or 
service providers. In addition, bundling may serve as a screening device designed to get those 
households least prone to switching products or providers to self-select into a bundle. 
Specifically, the act of combining services on one bill for a lower price may draw a group of 
marginal consumers who are relatively less prone to switching. 
What are the implications for firm and consumer strategies if bundling creates switching 
costs? The most obvious concern is that switching costs give sellers market power, allowing 
them to “raise price above competitors’ by an amount almost equal to the switching cost” 
(Farrell and Shapiro, 1988). That concern generates several related responses. From a policy 
perspective, switching costs are most worrisome with myopic consumers, who do not forecast 
the expense. If bundling creates switching costs, policy has less reason to worry about forward-
looking customers, who may ask for price discounts in advance. Empirically, however, these 
explanations cannot be distinguished in even the most ideal data, because both lead to the same 
prediction—slower switching at some later time. Interestingly, this last prediction is generally 
unquestioned in the literature on bundling. Though empirical evidence of switching costs arises 
in a variety of contexts, there is little empirical evidence of its presence or absence in 
telecommunications services
6
Beyond this, one may be concerned that switching costs create a barrier to entry (e.g., 
Porter, 1980). Specifically, incumbents have a cost advantage over potential entrants, and could 
exploit this to exclude entrants while still making positive profits. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) 
note that incumbents may not wish to do this if they are unable to distinguish new buyers from 
existing buyers. However, in this case it is standard practice for cable companies (and other 
firms) in this industry to price discriminate according to customers’ tenure with the company 
, or its consequences for bundling. 
                                                           




(e.g., through introductory, temporary price offers). Consequently, we may not be concerned 
with bundling as a means to extend market power, because it takes the form of mixed bundling. 
If it does indeed increase switching costs, however, we may be concerned that it harms 
competition/consumer welfare via increased long-term market power and stunted take-up of 
substitute services offered by entrants, such as satellite television or a cable over-builder. 
As our results below will suggest, if bundling creates switching costs, it can also help 
preserve shrinking markets. In our setting, the competing technologies of cell phones and 
broadband Internet threaten the robustness of wired telephone and even pay-television markets. 
Cable companies, who provide both services, may use bundling as a means to help keep these 
markets from shrinking too rapidly. 
To conclude this section, we note that a recent study conducted by the United States 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) provided some suggestive evidence of a causal link 
between bundling and churn (FCC, 2010). Specifically, in a survey of over 3,000 adults, 39 
percent of broadband users with the choice of more than one provider “said that having to change 
their current bundle of Internet, TV, and phone service was a major reason for keeping service” 
(with their current provider). While this is qualitative, inconclusive evidence on just one service, 
it does provide a “warm lead” for our analysis. It strongly suggests that bundling reduces churn, 
at least with respect to broadband service providers. Our analysis below will test this hypothesis, 
as well as several others, using actual household service choices. 
 
3. A Simple Model 
  To anticipate issues we face in the empirical section, we build in this section a simple 
model of consumer demand for telecommunications services. The triple play covers cable TV, 
broadband, and telephone services, so we consider these three services in our model. 
There exist N households, indexed by i = {1,…,N}, and three services, indexed by j = 
{1,2,3}. For a given household i, the utility it derives from purchasing service j at time t is 
formulated as Uj(Pjt,Xit), where Pjt is the price of service j at time t and Xit is a vector 
representing household i’s idiosyncratic characteristics that may affect service utility (e.g., 




decreasing in price. In this formulation, we now have the Boolean Dijt, which equals one if and 
only if household i purchases service j at time t, represented as: 
  
(1) 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑈 𝑗�𝑃 𝑗𝑡,𝑋𝑖𝑡� > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒          
 
 
In our case, we observe many X’s (but not price), so we can test the signs of ∂Uj/∂Xikt for each 
component k of X if we specify an econometric model for 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
The primary focus of this paper is to determine whether bundling creates switching costs 
and consequently reduces churn. Bundling can also affect service adoption patterns. Specifically, 
bundling enters through a contract price for the three services, which is less than the sum of 
prices for each service purchased individually.
7 In a standard model of bundled pricing in a 
frictionless world, a bundle contract price trades off two revenue streams. Assuming costs of 
provision are the same (no economies of scope), a bundle sacrifices revenue—i.e., total revenue 
per customer—from existing customers who would have bought all three services, and gains 
revenue from additional marginal adopters who purchase an additional service(s) they would 
otherwise not have purchased.
8
 We extend Xit to include bundle status at time t-1, Bit-1. Here, Bit-1 is a Boolean variable 
equaling one if household i purchased a bundle at time t-1 and zero otherwise. The focus of our 
empirics will be to identify the sign of ∂Ujt/∂Bit-1 because we do not observe price. The impact of 
switching costs is captured through ∂Ujt/∂Bit-1. If bundling raises switching costs, it will appear 
 The implications for a world of switching costs depend on how 
the friction arises during the dropping of a service. For example, frictions make the adopter more 
reluctant to drop the service, or switch to another supplier. That might lead to a longer collection 
of additional revenue or a different price level or both. We will observe proxies for whether there 
is longer collection, so it is useful to consider this further. 
                                                           
7 The presence of switching costs makes it theoretically possible for the bundled price to exceed the sum of each 
individual service price. However, in practice we are not aware of any cable firm that prices bundles this way. This 
is almost certainly due to a lack of sufficient market power and the presence of firms offering subsets of services, 
forcing those that can offer all three to offer mixed bundles, where the bundled price is no higher than the sum of 
individual prices. 
8 If the bundle saves costs to the supplier, then the model may be extended in a straightforward direction, leading to 




as if ∂Ujt/∂Bit-1 > 0, that is, as if utility for each service is higher if a bundle was purchased last 
period. To complete this model, we also include Dijt-1 and ATit-1. Here, ATit-1 is a Boolean 
variable equaling one if household i purchased all three services at time t-1, which can overlap 
with, or differ from, buying a bundle. These additional determinants of utility allow for the 
possibility of service-level switching costs and spillover effects from prior adoption of other 
services, respectively. Consequently, the choice model we envision is as follows: 
 
(2) 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑈 𝑗𝑡�𝑃 𝑗𝑡,𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−1,𝐵𝑖𝑡−1,𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1,𝑋𝑖𝑡� > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒          
 
 
We also consider a choice model at the firm level. This is especially appropriate for our 
study because a single firm—the local cable company—is the predominant provider of triple-
play bundles. If bundling increases switching costs, this could impact households’ decisions to 
switch away from purchasing a service from the local cable company. As with competition, 
bundling can drive a wedge between the demand for a service and the demand for a particular 
firm’s service. Further, by analyzing both service-level and service-provider-level demand, we 
can assess whether bundling’s effect is most prominent with regard to dropping a service or 
dropping a service provider. 
Below we show one of the several potential ways to illustrate this. Consider one model of 
a household i’s decision to purchase service j from the cable company c at time t as: 
 
(3) 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡 = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑈 𝑗𝑐𝑡�𝑃 𝑗𝑐𝑡,𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡−1,𝐵𝑖𝑡−1,𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1,𝑋𝑖𝑡� > 𝑈 𝑗𝑘𝑡�𝑃 𝑗𝑘𝑡,𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡−1,𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1,𝑋𝑖𝑡� ∀ 𝑘
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒          
 
 
Here, Dijct is a Boolean representing a given household’s decision to buy service j from 
the cable company at time t. We note here that our variable capturing a purchase of all three 
services at time t-1 (ATit-1) allows for purchase from any firm, implicitly assuming any spillovers 






  The choice model has several implications for our econometric exercise. The first two 
are well known. First, it is obvious that a single cross section of data from households cannot 
discern whether bundles reduce churn. Bundling’s effect can only be seen over time. Second, 
even with ideal household data an observer will be unable to identify the effect of bundling in the 
presence of stable demand. If the bundle price does not change over time, and the fundamentals 
behind demand do not change, the marginal adopter/dropper of service will not change. Pushing 
this point further, we should only be able to observe an effect from bundling when significant 
numbers of households drop a service or service provider, because bundling (at time t-1) is 
unable to influence the decision of a household that is adding a service or service provider (such 
households could not have had a triple-play bundle the prior period). 
 The impact of switching costs is captured through ∂Ujct/∂Bit-1. If 
bundling raises switching costs, it will appear as if ∂Ujct/∂Bit-1 > 0, that is, as if utility for each 
service from the cable company is higher if a bundle was purchased last period. 
Consider now the details behind the case where demand for a service is falling. This 
decline may be due to an exogenous increase in the technical capabilities of a service that 
substitute for one of the three services in the bundle, which induces a decreased demand for it. 
Abusing notation, that means 𝑈 𝑗𝑡(𝑃,𝑋) < 𝑈 𝑗𝑡−1(𝑃,𝑋), namely, utility is lower in time t in 
comparison to time t-1 with the same price and demographics. Bundling will deter dropping of 
service if it introduces a friction. That is, for the same X, households with bundling will hold on 
to the service longer. If no such effect is observed, then bundling likely has no effect on churn. 
As we’ll show below, we see this downward shift in demand for both pay television and wired 
telephone during one of our observed time periods.
10
Cable firms have clear incentives to deploy bundling if it slows down the dropping of 
service. One incentive arises from the retention of revenue for a longer period. The second 
 This allows us to measure the effect of 
bundling on households’ decisions to purchase these services in general, and to purchase them 
from the cable company.  
                                                           
9 For simplicity, we allow bundling to affect utility only for purchases from the cable company. This allows us to 
capture any switching costs via an increase in the utility for the cable company rather than a decrease in utility for all 
other providers, and thus provides a more natural link to our econometric model below. 
10 In this study we do not investigate the causes behind the decline in demand in much detail. The recession of 2008-
2009 was clearly the primary cause. We also follow considerable contemporary commentary and proceed under the 
assumption that the rise of online entertainment largely helped cause the decline in demand for pay television, while 




motive arises from spreading out the time it takes for demand to decline, which slows the rate at 
which the firm has to adjust the provision of services. The first motive always operates, and by 
itself, may be sufficient. The second motive could matter in the face of potential non-linear 
adjustment costs during large changes. 
To get a correct measurement of bundling’s effect, it is crucial to observe all relevant Xs. 
If an unobserved X correlates with the use of bundling, then observing behavior consistent with 
∂Ujt/∂Bit-1 > 0 or ∂Ujct/∂Bit-1 > 0 has two interpretations—either bundling or an unobserved X 
caused it. One obvious concern is that a given service’s price (which is unobserved) may be 
correlated with prior bundling behavior. If bundling in t-1 implies a lower price at time t (as 
compared to households that didn’t bundle in t-1), then it will appear as though bundling is 
reducing churn when it is really a price effect. We address this concern in two ways. First, in our 
empirics we control for location (and other demographics which may be correlated with prices), 
which can help capture variation in price menus faced by households. Second, we note that 
individual service prices and the bundle price were generally comprised of a low introductory 
price, followed by a price increase (usually after one year). To the extent that introductory (but 
not necessarily post-introductory) bundle prices represented the lowest-cost method of 
purchasing all three services for consumers, it can be argued that bundlers at time t-1 actually 
faced higher prices than non-bundlers, since the introductory bundle price would no longer be 
available.  Ultimately, our identifying assumption with regard to price is that households that 
bundled at time t-1 did not face substantially different price menus in time t as compared to 
households that did not bundle at time t-1, beyond the controls we include.  We discuss this issue 
further in Section 5. 
Another particular concern would be if bundling serves the role of a screen. That is, 
households with a low propensity to switch services/providers self-select into purchasing a 
bundle. In this case, an unobserved X (aversion to switching) would be positively correlated with 
bundling and with the (re-) purchase of a service, causing bundling to appear to reduce switching 
when it does not. While this is a plausible theory, bundling theory provides an important 
countervailing force. Households with a bundle entered into a bundled contract because they 
received a lower price, so the group of bundlers includes some households with lower marginal 
valuations for services than households who get the same service without bundle. These lower 




case, an unobserved X (low marginal value) is positively correlated with bundling and negatively 
correlated with (re-) purchase of a service. This would tend to mask a positive causal effect of 
bundling, if it exists. 
In our empirics, we seek some evidence of bundling serving as a screen. The potential 
presence of such unobserved heterogeneity again highlights the importance of using econometric 
techniques that isolate it (discussed in Section 5). 
For one of our services—broadband—demand expanded over the time period we 
observed, due to an exogenous increase in the capability of the service.
11
That said, as mentioned above, bundling’s effect is primarily identified through service-
dropping, so we do not expect its effect to be large in our data for broadband at the service level. 
Certainly some households drop broadband even while overall demand expands, but this is likely 
a very small group. However, when we instead consider broadband from the cable company 
(Dijct), there is likely a significant amount of dropping (churn) occurring. Broadband is still a 
relatively new service with many providers, meaning many households may still be learning their 
own preferences across providers.
 In the context of our 
model, this means 𝑈 𝑗𝑡(𝑃,𝑋) > 𝑈 𝑗𝑡−1(𝑃,𝑋) for any given P and X. If bundling leads to 
discounting, does that induce marginal adopters of a new and improving service, such as 
broadband, to adopt sooner than they would have without bundling? Not necessarily. Fully 
rational consumers would not change the timing of their behavior if they anticipated all the costs 
of bundling, including its switching costs. However, myopic or hyperbolic discounting 
consumers would purchase sooner, as would cash-constrained consumers. For such consumers 
bundling might generate faster adoption than observed in an otherwise similar population. 
Whether any of these factors matter is an empirical question. 
12
                                                           
11 We feel reasonably safe in assuming the increase is exogenous. The general capabilities of online entertainment 
were advancing during this time period, raising demand for services across all providers (e.g., Rosston et al., 2010). 
Some evidence of general increase in the capabilities of broadband providers exists, but the evidence is modest at 
most. The sparse evidence about quality and price from this period, such as it is, suggests that cable firms were 
improving their service at a slightly higher rate than phone companies offering DSL, but such improvements were 
not uniform across all firms or time periods (Greenstein and McDevitt, 2011).  
 Consequently, we expect any effect of bundling on 
broadband to be most evident at the provider, rather than service, level. 
12 For example, Prince (2011) found some suggestive evidence about households learning their preferred PC brand 




In the case of an expanding service such as broadband, we again should be concerned 
about unobserved heterogeneity driving our results due to bundling serving as a screen. 
However, because we expect the effect to be identified at the provider level, it is no longer clear 
that households dropping broadband service from the cable company are marginal adopters (they 
are merely switching providers, not dropping the service necessarily). Consequently, this is no 
longer an obvious source of unobserved heterogeneity. 
Nevertheless, it is possible the expanding demand for broadband generated an alternative 
source of unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, consider the following model. Suppose many 
households that bundled in period t-1 were marginal adopters, and also price sensitive. As 
demand overall increased, these households were no longer marginal but still price sensitive. 
This made them especially prone to purchasing the (price-discounted) bundle, and hence 
retaining broadband service. In this case, an unobserved X (price sensitive and no longer 
marginal at time t) is positively correlated with bundling and (re-) purchasing broadband service. 
Again, the possible presence of such unobserved heterogeneity requires econometric 




The data for this project came from Forrester Research, Inc. Each year since 1997, 
Forrester has collected thousands of mail surveys of U.S. households on their technology 
purchases and preferences. The surveys are known as “technographics” and are administered in 
December of each year. The earliest waves consisted of both independent cross sections and 
panel data, as a significant number of the same households were purposefully surveyed in 
consecutive years. Such panel data was used in Prince (2008) and potentially would be ideal for 
our purposes. Questions regarding triple-play bundling did not appear on the survey until 2006. 
Unfortunately, by this time repeated sampling of households had ceased. Hence, our usable data 
consisted of repeated cross sections. 
Our analysis focused on the three most recent waves with similar survey structure: 2007-




produce a survey that varies the population in different locations and economic circumstances, it 
also makes no pretense that its sample precisely represents the U.S. population. Hence, this 
demographic information provides both controls and identification of comparable subgroups 
across years when constructing a pseudo-panel (as described in Section 5). That is, we used the 
demographics to make sure our inferences were robust to slight variations in year-to-year 
composition of the sample of households. The demographic information we utilized includes 
DMA,
13
Beyond demographics, the data contained information on the use and providers of 
telecom services. Specifically, we could observe, for each year, whether a household subscribed 
to the following services: wired telephone, pay television (cable or satellite), and broadband 
Internet (cable, DSL, or satellite). For each of these services, we could observe the provider of a 
household’s subscription (e.g., Comcast, DirecTV, etc.).  
 education, income, household size, and age. 
However, this information was also limited in some important ways. We did not observe 
the quality of the service, its price (except in very limited form),
14
For reasons discussed in Section 2, we focused our attention on whether or not the 
provider was the local cable company. This was the firm in the near-unique position to offer a 
triple-play bundle during the years we observed. 
 nor the menu of choices put in 
front of each household. We also did not observe the price of services for the unchosen option(s), 
such as the prices for the bundle (for those who did not adopt a bundle) or the prices of 
individual services (for those who did adopt a bundle). Working around these limitations 
provided one of the principal challenges for our econometric approach. 
A key variable for our analysis concerned bundling behavior. Each year, Forrester asks 
the household whether it receives “a bundle of TV, Internet, and phone service from one 
company on one bill for a package price.” The answer to this question generated our binary 
“bundle” variable, and we were primarily interested in the effect of bundling behavior in one 
year on households’ service subscription choices the following year. 
                                                           
13 A DMA is a designated market area. DMAs generally coincide with sizeable cities in the United States. 
14 Forrester’s surveys generally do not include precise prices or expenditures, but only categories of expenditure, 




We provide summary statistics for all variables used in years 2007-2009 in Tables 1a–1c 
below. To be clear, these are the statistics of our sample and do not necessarily represent a 
representative sample of the U.S. population, so little should be inferred from the sample means.  
[Tables 1a 1b and 1c about here] 
 
5. Empirical Specification and Estimation Strategies 
5.1. The Empirical Model 
  We begin our empirical specification by constructing a model of product and firm 
choices at the household level. We employ a dynamic linear probability panel data model to 
explain household choices. We are trying to explain choices among the following services: wired 
telephone, pay television, broadband Internet, wired telephone with the cable company, pay 
television with the cable company, and broadband Internet with the cable company. Given a 
choice variable we want to model, let Yit be a binary variable that equals one if household i 
chooses to subscribe to that service/provider in time t and zero otherwise. For example, if we are 
modeling the wired telephone service decision, Yit = 1 if household i subscribes to wired 
telephone service in time t. Our econometric model then looks like this: 
(1) 𝑌 𝑖𝑡 = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝗽2𝑌 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝗽3𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝗽4𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Here we assume Xi is a vector of household characteristics that are constant over time,
15
The primary goal of our empirical analysis is to assess whether β3 > 0. This parameter 
literally measures the difference in churn rates at time t, between bundlers and non-bundlers (at 
 Bit-1 is a 
binary variable indicating whether the household had a bundle at time t-1, ATit-1 is a binary 
variable indicating whether the household had all three services at time t-1 (bundled or not), and 
εit constitutes unobservables (e.g., a child who strongly wants an active telephone in her room) 
for household i at time t that affects its choice on Y. The inclusion of Yit-1 and ATit-1 is important, 
as they respectively control for switching costs at the individual service level and spillover 
effects from purchasing either of the other two services. 
                                                           




time t-1). This is because β3 measures change in the rate of service adoption caused by a change 
in prior bundling status, holding the other variables fixed. Such a measure is only possible if 
prior service adoption occurred (i.e., Yit-1 = 1), because prior adoption not occurring implies prior 
bundling not occurring. Thus, β3 measures the difference in service adoption rates between prior 
adopters with a bundle and prior adopters without a bundle; such a difference can be due only to 
differences in churn rates.  
Of course, there is reason to believe Yit-1, ATit-1, and Bit-1 are endogenous. Put another 
way, we have reason to be concerned that these variables are correlated with unobservables that 
influence the service choice of household i at time t (Yit). For example, if a household has an 
inherent, persistent preference for wired-telephone connection (captured in both εit-1 and εit), it 
likely chose to purchase this service at time t-1 (i.e., Yit-1 = 1), and will likely choose to purchase 
this service at time t as well (i.e., Yit = 1). This will make it appear as though the purchase 
decision at t-1 influenced the purchase decision at time t, when in fact the household’s persistent 
preference for wired telephone drove both decisions. Beyond this, because we only have 
repeated cross-sectional data, we cannot actually observe Yit-1, ATit-1, and Bit-1 for a given 
household i. We address both of these concerns below. 
 
5.2. Estimation Using a Pseudo Panel 
If our data from Forrester were a panel, we would execute standard-panel data methods to 
estimate equation (1). However, because we have only repeated cross-sectional data, we must 
construct and utilize a pseudo (or synthetic) panel using these cross-sectional data. Such an 
approach began with Deaton (1985), and has been developed further by several subsequent 
papers in the econometrics literature (e.g., Moffitt, 1993; Collado, 1997; McKenzie, 2004; 
Verbeek and Vella, 2005). These techniques have most often been applied in macroeconomics, 
labor economics, and development economics, where available data are often in the form of 
repeated cross sections (e.g., Cuesta et al., 2011). 
In general, constructing a pseudo panel involves identifying a set of time-invariant 
criteria with which to construct data groupings. In our case, these criteria will consist of 






The above methodology has two key merits. First, it fills in the missing pieces in 
equation (1). For a given household i that we observe at time t, the averages for Y, AT, and B in 
the same group as household i at time t-1 intuitively provide information about Yit-1, ATit-1, and 
Bit-1. Second, it actually mitigates endogeneity concerns for our lagged variables. Whereas with 
panel data, we would have a clear concern that Cov(Yit-1,εit) ≠ 0, Cov(ATit-1,εit) ≠ 0, and/or 
Cov(Bit-1,εit) ≠ 0 due to re-observation of household i, this is not the problem we face when 
replacing lagged variables with group averages at t-1. Moffitt (1993) describes the above 
approach as an application of simple 2SLS, where in the first stage, we regress Yht-1, ATht-1, and 
Bht-1 on group dummies. Then, in the second stage, we use the predicted values from the first 
stage (which will simply be group averages) when estimating equation (1). 
 We reason that information about lagged variables (Yit-1, ATit-1, and Bit-1) for 
household i can be gathered by observing Yht-1, ATht-1, and Bht-1 for households h in the same 
group as household i. To this end, we follow the approach described in Moffitt (1993) and 
further discussed in Verbeek and Vella (2005). Specifically, for each household i in a given 
group g, we replace Yit-1, ATit-1, and Bit-1 with 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1, 𝐴𝑇𝑔𝑡−1, and 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1, respectively. The latter 
three variables are the averages for Y, AT, and B in group g at time t-1.  
While the justification of Moffitt (1993) for using group means as instruments is 
intuitive, we follow the discussion in Verbeek and Vella (2005) to pin down the assumptions we 
employ for identification. We begin by reformulating equation (1): 
(2) 𝑌 𝑖𝑡 = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝗽2𝑌𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝗽3𝐵𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝗽4𝐴𝑇𝑔𝑡−1 + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽2�𝑌 𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1� +
𝗽3�𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1� + 𝗽4�𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐴𝑇𝑔𝑡−1�) 
Given a choice of groupings, it is this equation we will estimate with our data, where the terms in 
parentheses constitute our “error term.” Written this way, the use of group averages essentially 
introduces measurement error, in the form of 𝑌 𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1, 𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1, and 𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 −
𝐴𝑇 𝑔𝑡−1. As Verbeek and Vella (2005) note, this measurement error is uncorrelated with our 
                                                           
16 The stable demographics are partially a consequence of the research design employed by Forrester. In the 
presence of large changes in the demographic makeup of the sample before and after an econometric “treatment,” a 




explanatory variables, in particular 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1, 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1, and 𝐴𝑇𝑔𝑡−1. Hence, this eliminates concerns 
about a classical errors-in-variables (CEV) problem that could induce bias
17
Formulating the econometric model as we do in equation (2) allows us to determine the 
necessary assumptions for our parameters to be identified. On a broad level, we simply need our 
composite error term to be uncorrelated with our explanatory variables. However, by considering 
each part of the composite error term, we can determine the believability of this assumption. To 
begin, as noted above, the measurement error is not correlated with the group averages by 
construction. In addition, the measurement error is not correlated with Xi because Xi does not 
vary over time (Verbeek and Vella, 2005). 
. 
This means identification depends on a key assumption, that the idiosyncratic term (εit) is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Maintaining that εit and Xi are uncorrelated is 
standard, as the components of Xi play the role of “exogenous” demographic controls. Further, 
we note here that our controls help account for price variations (which we cannot observe). 
Specifically, telecom service prices generally vary regionally. Hence, our regional DMA controls 
account for a great deal of unobserved price variation. 
Assuming εit is uncorrelated with 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1, 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1, and 𝐴𝑇𝑔𝑡−1 could be more problematic. 
As noted in Verbeek and Vella (2005), this requires us to believe the unobservables harbor no 
“group effects.” The existence of such group effects creates obvious concern for bias in β2 
because they directly imply correlation between 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1 and εit; however, their potential for bias in 
β3 and β4 depends on whether we believe these group effects that impact Y are also correlated 
with B and/or AT. Regardless, even if we believe any group effects would be uncorrelated with B 
and AT, a bias in β2 can generate a bias in β3 and/or β4. Hence, to have the greatest faith in our 
estimates, we want to maintain the assumption of no group effects.  
In principle, we can completely eliminate the presence of group effects in our 
unobservables by including group fixed effects in X. However, having only two waves of usable 
                                                           
17 To further illustrate this point, we demonstrate this claim with regard to our bundle variable.  Specifically, we note 
that 𝐶𝑜𝑣�𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1,𝐵𝑔𝑡−1� = 𝐸 ��𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1� ∗ 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1� − 𝐸�𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1� ∗ 𝐸�𝐵𝑔𝑡−1� = 𝐸�𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 ∗
𝐵𝑔𝑡−1−𝐸𝐵𝑔𝑡−1∗𝐵𝑔𝑡−1−0=1𝑁𝑔∗𝑁𝑔∗𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑡−12−1𝑁𝑔2∗𝑁𝑔2∗𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑡−12=0.  Here, Ng is the number of 




data severely limits remaining variation in our variables. Further, we believe most of our 
identification power resides in our second wave of data, which exhibits market contraction. 
Therefore, we proceed without group fixed effects, and maintain the assumption that no group 
effects beyond those captured in X exist. This implies that cross-sectional variation in 
unobservables (having controlled for X) are transient. The believability of this assumption 
depends on our method for constructing groups (and the persistence of our results across 
specifications), which we now describe. 
We construct our groups using classic demographic measures in our data. These include 
DMA, income level, education level, household size, and age.
18
Recognizing this tradeoff when constructing our groupings, we opt for a larger number of 
groups because it allows us to include important controls without completely eliminating 
variation in our averaged variables (bundle, adoption of all three services, and prior adoption). 
Perhaps the most important controls in our analyses are DMA-level dummy variables. These 
controls net out persistent price and service quality differences across locations, which certainly 
exist and we do not directly observe. Consequently, our benchmark results group our 
observations according to DMA, income, education, household size, and age. Here, the 
 The question then is where to 
draw the boundaries for the groups, and it is here that we face a tradeoff, part of which is 
summarized in Cuesta et al. (2011). The tradeoff for our analysis is summarized as follows. As 
we draw tighter boundaries, we have more groups but a smaller number of observations per 
group. With more groups, we generate more variation in our variables (in particular with regard 
to our variables measured at the group level), creating more “observations” and hence greater 
identification power. More groups also allow us to include more “X” controls. With more 
controls, the existence of “group effects” in the unobservables becomes less likely, thus making 
our assumption that εit is uncorrelated with 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1, 𝐴𝑇𝑔𝑡−1, and 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1 more credible. However, 
with fewer observations per group, the group means used in the regression will be poor estimates 
of the true population mean for that group. This essentially will inflate the variance in our 
composite error term, and hence tend to inflate standard errors. 
                                                           
18 Note that the control for DMA precludes identifying any characterization of the competitive supply if it is shared 
by all users within a DMA. So, for example, if FiOS or RCN is in some DMAs and not others, the dummies will 
capture this facet of the situation, and that does not shape the estimates of bundling. If there is a change in FiOS or 
RCN over time, the dummy coefficient estimates will be different across the years, which prevents such changes 




categories for the last four measures are as defined in Tables 1a-1c. We consider some coarser 
groupings; however, the importance of including DMA-level dummies precludes us from 
coarsening our groupings too much. For example, we do not conduct analysis for observations 
grouped only at the DMA level. In this case, DMA-level dummies are impossible to include; 
without them, our results would be highly suspect because we’d have inadequate controls for 
unobservable price variation and service quality variation. 
Our primary use of tight group boundaries can result in very few observations in a group. 
In fact, in some cases, a non-empty group in one year, say 2008, may be empty in the prior year 
(i.e., 2007) in our data. Left as is, these observations would be dropped in our analysis. However, 
to fully explore our results when imposing tight boundaries, instead of dropping observations 
that belong to groups that were empty the prior year, we identify their nearest neighbors and use 
their average measures for 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1, 𝐴𝑇𝑔𝑡−1, and 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1. Specifically, for a given household i in 
year t that belongs to a group g that was empty in t-1, we identify the households in t-1 “nearest” 
to that group, and use them to construct 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1, 𝐴𝑇𝑔𝑡−1, and 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1. 
We identify the nearest household(s) following Abadie et al. (2004), employing a vector 
norm metric along the dimensions used to determine the groups. For example, if a group g is 
defined as households in St. Louis with income of $50-$70K, a college education, four members, 
and head of household ages 45-54, the closest group may be households in St. Louis with income 
$50-$70K, some college, four members, and head of household ages 45-54. We would then use 
the sample averages for this neighboring group for 𝑌𝑔𝑡−1, 𝐴𝑇𝑔𝑡−1, and 𝐵𝑔𝑡−1. 
Implementing this approach for narrowly defined groups will increase measurement error 
but allow us to use all observations in our year pairings (2007 and 2008, and 2008 and 2009). It 
also opens the possibility for a CEV problem, because we can no longer assume the 
measurement error is uncorrelated with the group mean used for each observation. Hence, the 
tradeoff of using this approach is quite clear. On the one hand, it increases the number of 
observations used; this merit is especially important if one has a dataset with many cells that are 
non-empty in one year and empty in another. On the other hand, this approach introduces the 





5.3. Testing for Screening and Selection 
  As noted above, price savings offered by bundling may entice households with lower 
marginal valuation. A household’s inherent preference for inertia also may induce selection into 
a bundle, though it is something unobservable to both service providers and the econometrician. 
  We address screening issues in two ways. First, we attempt to further establish that our 
estimates from equation (2) are causal (and not due to screening) by including further controls. In 
particular, we estimate this model controlling for heavy cell-phone use at time t-1 (for wired 
telephone regressions) and heavy online content consumption at time t-1 (for pay television 
regressions). These added controls clearly predict churn rates for some of our services, and if 
bundling selects households along these dimensions, our causal inference may be biased.  
Second, we recognize that bundling may have a causal effect on service purchases while 
also playing the role of a screen. Assuming our causal estimates withstand our added controls, 
we can at least attempt to assess whether bundling households have different characteristics than 
non-bundling households. Because we do not observe individual households’ bundle statuses 
from previous years, we cannot test for a correlation with the unobservables in the error term (εit) 
via, e.g., a Hausman test. Despite such limitations, we still have several options. We can at least 
test whether, along the demographic measures we observe, bundlers significantly differ from 
non-bundlers who also purchased all three services. Any differences we find would suggest that 
bundling plays a screening role—picking off households that are less inclined to churn services 
and/or service providers. Any implied screening effect that we find would supplement causal 
effects we identify, because, by design, our econometric model above abstracts away from any 
correlation between unobserved household characteristics and bundling status. 
6. Results 
6.1. Does Bundling Reduce Churn? 
In Tables 2a-2d, we present our results
19
                                                           
19 Because we are using a linear probability model, there is heteroskedasticity by construction. All of our results 
contain robust standard errors. 
 for our six choice variables (wired telephone, 




the cable company, and broadband with the cable company) for 2008 and 2009. The key 
estimates are in the main tables and the full results are in the appendix. 
Before looking at the results for bundling we examined all the estimates for symptoms 
that the model performs reasonably well. For example, as expected, broadband demand was 
monotonic in income (increasing), education (increasing), size of household (increasing except at 
the highest level), and age of head of household (decreasing, especially after 65). Further, as we 
might expect, we found evidence of switching costs for each service individually (captured by 
positive coefficients for Yit-1). For example, subscription to pay television at time t-1 increased 
the likelihood of subscribing to pay television at time t. Given our control for this effect, any 
effect we found for bundling was above and beyond any switching costs at the individual service 
level. Lastly, it is interesting to note that a purchase of the other two services at time t-1 appeared 
to generate very little, if any, spillover effects for any of the services. We will translate these 
estimates into their quantitative and economic importance below. 
The results indicated an effect of households’ bundle status, but it appeared to differ 
across services/providers and years. In particular, in 2008 bundling appeared to reduce churn 
with respect to broadband, broadband with the cable company, and wired telephone with the 
cable company. In 2009 bundling appeared to reduce churn with respect to pay television, wired 
telephone with the cable company, and pay television with the cable company
20
The only instances where we observed some differences involved broadband. 
Specifically, we found a significant effect of bundling for broadband and broadband with cable 
company for some of our alternative groupings (e.g., grouping along DMA, income, education, 
and household size—no longer grouping on age).
. This pattern of 
results held up well to different groupings we tried where the number of groups remained large. 
21
                                                           
20 Note that our results for the cable company still use the same bundle dummy variable, which may include non-
cable bundles (although a relatively small proportion); hence, these are likely lower bounds on bundling’s effect on 
service purchases at the cable company. Our results generally hold if we use information on service purchases to 
deduce whether the bundle was with the cable company; however, constructing such a variable introduces extra 
measurement error (coming from both the bundle response and the service purchase response), resulting in some 
apparent, minor attenuation bias in our 2007-2008 results.  
 We discuss this peculiarity further below. 
21 These results are available from the authors upon request. We did not include them because generating one small 




Finally, we estimated our econometric model using the datasets we constructed using a 
nearest-neighbor algorithm (described in Section 5). The results are in Tables 3a-3d. They mimic 
those in Tables 2a-2d very strongly in the demographics, and are similar in our core estimates, 
bundling. The smaller coefficient estimates suggest a CEV problem, which generates attenuation 
bias (as discussed in Section 5). However, the relative sizes of the bundle coefficients across 
services and years are notably similar to those in Tables 2a-2d. Hence, it appears that this method 
of extending our pseudo panel can be effective, although it can come at the expense of some 
attenuation bias, at least in our circumstance. 
   Overall, these results suggest that bundling reduces churn in many instances, but the 
variance in its effect is curious. We believe two fundamental drivers produce this pattern. The 
first is very straightforward—effects from bundling are more visible in “turbulent” markets. Put 
another way, we only expect an effect from bundling in markets where a significant amount of 
turnover in services and/or service providers exists. At the time of our data, wired telephone and 
pay television were widely diffused, while broadband was still in the midst of diffusing. Hence, 
we may only expect to see an effect on telephone and pay television if the demand for them 
declines, and broadband (particularly broadband with the cable company) if demand grows (as 
discussed in Section 3). 
As it turned out, economic forces strongly trended toward demand declines in the two 
services vulnerable to it. The United States suffered a deep recession during the time period of 
our data, whose nadir was sometime in 2009. Consequently, wired-telephone and pay-television 
markets experienced a great deal of turmoil in the form of service-dropping between 2008 and 
2009. In Table 4, we present simple summary statistics for overall adoption rates for our six 
choice variables. In it we see the wired-telephone and pay-television markets were very stable 
between 2007 and 2008, but both took major downturns between 2008 and 2009. Concurrently, 
we see broadband continue a steady diffusion, moving from 59 percent to 62 percent to 68 
percent of our sample between 2007 and 2009. 
  If the effects of bundling are generally only visible in turbulent markets, our results 
suggest that bundling reduces churn for all services and service providers, and we simply 
observed it during a time of market turbulence. While this is our general conclusion based on our 




broadband from the cable company remains. Specifically, we measured an effect in 2008, and in 
2009 we didn’t see an effect using our primary groupings, but do in some alternative groupings 
(e.g., grouping by DMA, income, education, and household size only). 
We contend that this is likely due to a feedback effect from bundling’s effect on pay 
television, which sometimes masks its effect on broadband. Specifically, as subscription to pay 
television dramatically declined in 2009, we saw the emergence of a new phenomenon. During 
this time, there was a significant shift by households toward subscribing to broadband Internet 
and not subscribing to pay television. 
In Table 5, we illustrate this shift. Table 5 shows the proportions of households for all 
four combinations of television and broadband subscription statuses across our three years of 
data. In 2009 the proportion of households with broadband and no television dramatically 
increased compared to 2008, while all other proportions remained relatively stable or declined. 
The shift is of comparable magnitude to the shift in television subscription over the same period, 
suggesting it represents a significant number of households moving from subscribing to 
television and broadband (or possibly television and no broadband) to subscribing only to 
broadband.
22
  Table 5 indicates that, for a subset of the population, broadband became a substitute for 
pay television. To corroborate this claim, we note that the most likely group to choose to 
substitute broadband for television in the face of a recession would be those most capable of 
using broadband to view programming content and have the greatest need to save money. In the 
context of our demographic measures, this group likely consists of younger, educated households 
with less income. Table 6 presents and compares across 2008 and 2009 the averages of our 
demographic measures for the group of households with broadband service but no television 
service. Here, we see that this group became younger and more educated, and had lower income 
in 2009, as expected. 
    
                                                           
22 It may appear from Table 5 that the rise in the proportion of households with broadband and no TV mirrors the 
drop in households with TV and no broadband. However, as broadband continued to diffuse during this time, the 
households newly adopting broadband were likely from the group with TV and no broadband, thus moving them 
into the group with TV and broadband. The size of the latter group remained constant because pre-existing members 




  As further corroboration of this idea, we note that the availability of streaming online 
content was increasing at a rapid pace by 2009. Major providers such as Hulu and Netflix began 
establishing a significant presence in this market around this time. Specifically, Hulu launched in 
March 2008, and Netflix began offering unlimited Internet streaming in January 2008. 
    If a significant number of households in 2009 substituted broadband for pay television, 
our measured effect of bundling on broadband and broadband from the cable company in 2009 
could be reduced via a feedback effect. This is because, for households dropping television 
service, broadband service is more likely.  However, this group is also less likely to have 
bundled, because bundling reduces churn. Hence, the measured effect of bundling on broadband 
will be less than its “true” effect, because the measured effect captures both the effect of 
switching costs for broadband and the effect of less churn in television. 
  Taken as a whole, our results indicate the following. Bundling reduces churn, and its 
effect is most visible when markets are turbulent. In addition, broadband appears to have 
emerged as a substitute for television for a significant number of households in 2009. Bundling’s 
churn-reducing effect on television likely prevented some households from dropping television 
to go “broadband-only,” thus creating a smaller net effect of bundling on broadband. 
The effect also appears to be economically significant. For example, in 2009, bundling 
the prior year increased the likelihood of subscribing to pay television and wired telephone from 
the cable company by 2.2 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively. This not only represents a 
substantial revenue boost for 2009, but to the extent that bundling persists (and household 
bundling increased over the time period we observe), it could mean increased revenues for 
multiple years. 
As an attempt to quantify bundling’s effect, we conduct a simple back-of-the-envelope 
calculation of preserved revenue (in the face of declining demand) that could be attributed to 
bundling. We focus our measurement on pay television, as this is one of our declining markets in 
2009 both at the product level and for cable companies in particular.
23
                                                           
23 Wired telephone also declined in 2009, however not at the cable company level, as shown in Table 4. The increase 
in wired telephone at the cable company in spite of an overall decline is almost certainly due to concurrent switching 
from traditional wired telephone to VOIP. The effect of bundling for wired telephone for the cable company would 




indicate that the purchase rate of pay television from cable companies in 2009 was 2.2 
percentage points higher when a household had a bundle in 2008, compared to when it did not. 
From Table 1b, we see that 27.9 percent of households in our study had a triple-play bundle in 
2008. Further, even if we weight our observations to match the U.S. population demographically, 
this percentage reaches a similar number. Therefore, a simple calculation of revenue preservation 
for 2009 would be:  
Annual Revenue Preservation = 12*(Bundle Revenue – (Phone+Broadband Revenue))*(# of 
U.S. Households)*(0.279)*(0.022) 
Using a conservative estimate of $30 per month for the difference in bundle revenue and 
(phone+broadband) revenue,
24
As the above calculation highlights, the long-term impact of bundling on revenue should 
factor into a firm’s consideration of tradeoffs when deciding if and how to bundle (as discussed 
in Section3). Further, as illustrated, it may play a substantial role in helping stave off contraction 
in the wired-telephone and pay-television markets. 
 and 117 million as the number of U.S. households, the preserved 
revenue then is $259 million, which is a substantial number for the entire market. Further, this is 
revenue for just one year—bundling effects could certainly persist for a longer period of time.  
6.2. Bundling as a Screen and Selection 
  As discussed in Section 5.3, bundling could serve the role of a screen by identifying a set 
of households least inclined to drop services or service providers. If this is the case, there are two 
possibilities: 1) only screening is occurring, and our measures of bundling’s causal effect are 
biased due to this practice; or 2) screening is occurring in addition to bundling’s causal effect on 
churn. Possibility #1 can occur only if unobservable household characteristics are correlated with 
average bundling behavior of similar households (in the same group) the prior period. The 
recession of 2009 helped generate variation in our groups over time. However, there still may be 
persistent, unobserved “group effects” correlated with bundling and lower churn rates. We 
further investigate this possibility by including some additional controls. Specifically, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
then more properly be characterized as revenue enhancing rather than preserving, although both circumstances result 
in higher revenues than would have occurred otherwise. 




measure whether households at time t-1 are heavy cell-phone users (measured as daily sending 
and/or receiving of text messages) or heavy online-content consumers (measured as weekly 
watching of online television shows). We then control for these in our estimates of equation (2) 
for wired telephone and pay television, respectively. In both cases, while these variables do have 
some explanatory power for churn (particularly in 2009), their inclusion has virtually no impact 
on our bundling estimates. This provides further evidence that bundling does in fact have a 
causal effect (not confounded by screening). 
The totality of our empirical analysis leads us to believe that, if screening is occurring, it 
supplements a causal bundling effect on churn. We can only provide suggestive evidence of 
bundling playing the role of a screen. We do this by conducting simple comparisons along our 
demographic measures between households who bundled and households who purchased all 
three services but did not bundle. We present these results in Table 7. 
Here, we see that bundlers generally have lower income and lower education levels. 
Further, there is some mild evidence that they live in larger households and are younger. These 
findings illustrate non-trivial differences between bundlers and non-bundlers of all three services 
along basic demographics, suggesting bundlers are a somewhat selected group. To the extent that 
selection along these dimensions is related to selection according to propensity to switch, 
bundling may play the role of a screen, in addition to its direct impact on switching costs. 
However, the importance of income suggests that bundling probably also picks up users who are 
sensitive to price, namely, marginal demanders. Overall, bundling probably combines both. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented a novel explanation for firms to bundle that is particularly 
pertinent in recurrent service industries—reduction of churn. We tested whether bundling 
appears to increase switching costs by analyzing household-level choices for telecommunications 
services that are often packaged in a triple play: wired telephone, pay television (satellite or 
cable), and broadband Internet. 
We found that bundling does reduce churn for the three services in a triple-play bundle. 




effect is only evident in our data when services experienced “turmoil.” We also found suggestive 
evidence of broader demand factors shaping the effect of bundling, but these effects lie outside 
the scope of existing theory. More households appear to view broadband as a substitute for 
television, which implies a smaller net effect of bundling on broadband churn. Finally, we tested 
for screening in supplemental analysis. While not conclusive, these differences suggest that 
bundlers are a selected sample of households, and therefore may differ on other relevant 
dimensions, including propensity to switch. 
  Our findings have several implications. First, they imply that bundling firms can earn 
higher margins on bundling customers than they otherwise would if bundling did not create 
switching costs. However, to the extent that households recognize the increased switching costs 
they impose, bundling firms may need to offer their bundles at especially low introductory prices 
(Farrell and Shapiro, 1988). In addition, bundling may dissuade entry, as a significant proportion 
of customers are “locked in” to their service/provider choices through a bundle.  Potential 
entrants such as Verizon’s FiOS or AT&T’s U-Verse may have reduced incentives to enter 
markets where a significant number of potential customers already have a bundle with an 
incumbent. Third, bundling may help firms slow down contracting markets. In our setting, triple-
play bundling appears to help mitigate demand contractions in both wired telephone and cable 
television. Next, to the extent that bundling serves as a screen, it can be useful for bundling firms 
in optimizing efforts to retain customers, recognizing that such efforts are best used on non-
bundlers.  
We  note  that  the welfare effects of bundling in our  case  were  ambiguous, as they 
depended on the nature of switching costs that are created. If bundles only increase the hassle of 
switching, the welfare effects are likely negative; however, if they increase realized value that 
customers are reluctant to relinquish via switching, welfare gains could result. 
Our findings also motivate further work on the role of bundling in other contexts. We saw 
a variety of areas where users chose a supplier for services and then periodically considered 
switching between vendors. Our work motivates further investigation of markets where such user 
behavior dominates economic conduct. For example, many software markets have increasingly 




common in that market. We look forward to further empirical evidence on the relevance of such 
practices to competitive outcomes. 
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Summary Statistics 2007 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  # of Obs. 
Telephone  0.907999  0.289031  49847 
Television  0.828355  0.377076  49847 
Broadband  0.593857  0.491117  49847 
TelephoneCableCo  0.105242  0.306868  49847 
TelevisionCableCo  0.538046  0.498555  49847 
BroadbandCableCo  0.253837  0.43521  49847 
Bundle  0.225089  0.417645  49847 
All Three Services  0.485967  0.499808  49847 
Less Than H.S.  0.05563  0.229209  49847 
H.S. Degree  0.24846  0.432124  49847 
Some College  0.343792  0.474978  49847 
College Degree  0.215861  0.411422  49847 
Graduate Degree  0.136257  0.343065  49847 
< 25K  0.188617  0.391208  49847 
25K – 49K  0.298554  0.457628  49847 
50K – 69K  0.187233  0.390102  49847 
70K – 99K  0.165326  0.371478  49847 
100K+  0.16027  0.36686  49847 
HHSize = 1  0.157181  0.363975  49847 
HHSize = 2  0.363091  0.480896  49847 
HHSize = 3  0.208839  0.406483  49847 
HHSize = 4  0.171425  0.376883  49847 
HHSize = 5+  0.099464  0.299288  49847 
Age < 25  0.091319  0.288066  49847 
Age 25-34  0.162758  0.369149  49847 
Age 35-44  0.196381  0.397264  49847 
Age 45-54  0.221518  0.415272  49847 
Age 55-64  0.170321  0.375919  49847 







Summary Statistics 2008 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  # of Obs. 
Telephone  0.901694  0.297731  47698 
Television  0.822529  0.382071  47698 
Broadband  0.61925  0.485576  47698 
TelephoneCableCo  0.141872  0.348922  47698 
TelevisionCableCo  0.530651  0.499065  47698 
BroadbandCableCo  0.290809  0.45414  47698 
Bundle  0.278649  0.448339  47698 
All Three Services  0.508197  0.499938  47698 
Less Than H.S.  0.063126  0.243193  47698 
H.S. Degree  0.260451  0.438885  47698 
Some College  0.336597  0.472551  47698 
College Degree  0.209191  0.406735  47698 
Graduate Degree  0.130634  0.337004  47698 
< 25K  0.204055  0.403013  47698 
25K – 49K  0.277328  0.447685  47698 
50K – 69K  0.179483  0.383761  47698 
70K – 99K  0.159147  0.365817  47698 
100K+  0.179987  0.38418  47698 
HHSize = 1  0.171307  0.376781  47698 
HHSize = 2  0.368925  0.482519  47698 
HHSize = 3  0.203363  0.402504  47698 
HHSize = 4  0.161537  0.36803  47698 
HHSize = 5+  0.094868  0.293035  47698 
Age < 25  0.082268  0.274775  47698 
Age 25-34  0.134974  0.3417  47698 
Age 35-44  0.17898  0.38334  47698 
Age 45-54  0.213699  0.409921  47698 
Age 55-64  0.189652  0.392029  47698 








Summary Statistics 2009 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  # of Obs. 
Telephone  0.854976  0.35213  36194 
Television  0.773858  0.418338  36194 
Broadband  0.6784  0.467097  36194 
TelephoneCableCo  0.164613  0.370836  36194 
TelevisionCableCo  0.446704  0.497158  36194 
BroadbandCableCo  0.317843  0.465644  36194 
Less Than H.S.  0.062027  0.241208  36194 
H.S. Degree  0.249378  0.432659  36194 
Some College  0.330055  0.470239  36194 
College Degree  0.221307  0.415133  36194 
Graduate Degree  0.137233  0.344098  36194 
< 25K  0.197408  0.398049  36194 
25K – 49K  0.260955  0.439161  36194 
50K – 69K  0.164641  0.370861  36194 
70K – 99K  0.174891  0.379879  36194 
100K+  0.202105  0.401576  36194 
HHSize = 1  0.161988  0.368445  36194 
HHSize = 2  0.343565  0.474905  36194 
HHSize = 3  0.20263  0.401965  36194 
HHSize = 4  0.177074  0.381736  36194 
HHSize = 5+  0.114743  0.318716  36194 
Age < 25  0.093634  0.291323  36194 
Age 25-34  0.160773  0.367326  36194 
Age 35-44  0.196607  0.397438  36194 
Age 45-54  0.19622  0.397143  36194 
Age 55-64  0.174559  0.379595  36194 
Age 65+  0.178206  0.382692  36194 
 
 
                                                           
25 We did not include the variable “Bundle” or “All Three Services” in this table because we did not use these 










Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  Telephone  Television  Broadband 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVarAvgt-1  0.184743**  0.012256  0.169289**  0.009366  0.161881**  0.012196 
BundleAvgt-1  -0.00271  0.005634  0.005715  0.006959  0.015415+  0.008615 




household size, age 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.104  0.068  0.198 
Observations  34070  34070  34070 
 
 
Table 2b: 2007-2008  
 
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  TelephoneCableCo  TelevisionCableCo  BroadbandCableCo 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVarAvgt-1  0.149843**  0.012478  0.184701**  0.0079  0.156389**  0.009327 
BundleAvgt-1  0.013511+  0.008183  -0.0111  0.009751  0.022765*  0.009355 




household size, age 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.056  0.065  0.093 
Observations  34070  34070  34070 
 
   
                                                           
26 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 









Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  Telephone  Television  Broadband 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVarAvgt-1  0.256198**  0.01344  0.201352**  0.011716  0.22366**  0.012296 
BundleAvgt-1  0.009231  0.006851  0.022288**  0.007904  0.007229  0.00844 




household size, age 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.140  0.083  0.239 
Observations  25668  25668  25668 
 
 
Table 2d: 2008-2009 
 
 Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  TelephoneCableCo  TelevisionCableCo  BroadbandCableCo 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVarAvgt-1  0.183547**  0.012094  0.203363**  0.008644  0.201266**  0.00975 
BundleAvgt-1  0.035604**  0.00851  0.022013*  0.010114  0.005973  0.009715 




household size, age 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.073  0.075  0.115 
Observations  25668  25668  25668 
 
   
                                                           
27 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 










Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  Telephone  Television  Broadband 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVart-1  0.083544**  0.005228  0.068013**  0.005124  0.067105**  0.007489 
Bundlet-1  -0.00159  0.003332  0.001374  0.004367  0.008327  0.005189 




household size, age 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.095  0.057  0.176 
Observations  47698  47698  47698 
 
 
Table 3b: 2007-2008 
  
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  TelephoneCableCo  TelevisionCableCo  BroadbandCableCo 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVart-1  0.056902**  0.006238  0.072685**  0.004751  0.062294**  0.005181 
Bundlet-1  0.004778  0.004703  -0.00243  0.005717  0.008903+  0.005181 




household size, age 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.047  0.054  0.083 
Observations  47698  47698  47698 
 
   
                                                           
28 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 








Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  Telephone  Television  Broadband 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVart-1  0.117952**  0.006447  0.087545**  0.006561  0.094963**  0.007817 
Bundlet-1  0.001478  0.004201  0.006919  0.005178  0.002114  0.005292 




household size, age 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.123  0.066  0.209 
Observations  36194  36194  36194 
 
 
Table 3d: 2008-2009 
  
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  TelephoneCableCo  TelevisionCableCo  BroadbandCableCo 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVart-1  0.084987**  0.006466  0.087571**  0.005424  0.086076**  0.005726 
Bundlet-1  0.01531**  0.005231  0.009568  0.006187  0.005879  0.005818 




household size, age 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.057  0.058  0.097 
Observations  36194  36194  36194 
 
   
                                                           
29 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 





Service adoption levels by year 
Variable  Year  Adoption Rate 
Telephone  2007  0.9080 
  2008  0.9017 
  2009  0.8550 
Television  2007  0.8284 
  2008  0.8225 
  2009  0.7739 
Broadband  2007  0.5939 
  2008  0.6193 
  2009  0.6784 
TelephoneCableCo  2007  0.1052 
  2008  0.1419 
  2009  0.1646 
TelevisionCableCo  2007  0.5380 
  2008  0.5307 
  2009  0.4467 
BroadbandCableCo  2007  0.2538 
  2008  0.2908 










Proportions of households with all possible broadband and (pay) television service combinations 
Year  TV & Broadband  TV & No 
Broadband 
No TV & 
Broadband 
No TV & No 
Broadband 
2007  0.4945  0.3084  0.0664  0.1307 
2008  0.5399  0.2785  0.0650  0.1165 









2007  2008  2009 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Age 25-34  -0.02684**  0.004272  -0.02571**  0.004739  -0.0537**  0.006529 
Age 35-44  -0.04743**  0.004139  -0.04394**  0.00452  -0.07195**  0.006301 
Age 45-54  -0.0486**  0.004088  -0.04731**  0.004444  -0.08718**  0.006312 
Age 55-64  -0.05936**  0.004384  -0.06029**  0.004667  -0.10691**  0.006669 
Age 65+  -0.06793**  0.004431  -0.07181**  0.004719  -0.1241**  0.006766 
25K – 49K  -0.00669*  0.003027  -0.00139  0.003176  0.003888  0.004705 
50K – 69K  -0.01142**  0.003472  -0.00766*  0.003625  -0.00539  0.005428 
70K – 99K  -0.0173**  0.00369  -0.01276**  0.003835  -0.02348**  0.005525 
100K+  -0.03333**  0.003929  -0.02235**  0.003958  -0.0318**  0.005636 
H.S. Degree  0.009667*  0.004398  0.001303  0.004546  0.019587**  0.006688 
Some College  0.029969**  0.004353  0.027016**  0.004509  0.048667**  0.006634 
College 
Degree  0.053895**  0.004725  0.047302**  0.004908  0.072536**  0.007191 
Graduate 
Degree  0.068672**  0.005073  0.057847**  0.005334  0.085964**  0.007773 
HHSize = 2  -0.00168  0.003096  -0.00735*  0.003186  -0.01151*  0.004752 
HHSize = 3  -0.00212  0.003589  -0.01064**  0.003748  -0.01954**  0.005495 
HHSize = 4  0.01185**  0.003851  0.002673  0.004061  -0.00612  0.00584 
HHSize = 5+  0.037211**  0.0044  0.027081**  0.004643  0.019868**  0.006482 
Constant  0.087547**  0.005805  0.095941**  0.006195  0.167391**  0.00892 
R-squared  0.017  0.016  0.021 
Observations  59368  52765  41580 
 
                                                           





Demographics for bundlers and non-bundlers (with all three services) by year 
Year  Variable  Mean for 
Bundlers 
Mean for Non-
Bundlers with all 
3 services 
Different at 5% 
level? 
2007  Income  3.034  3.197  Yes 
  Education  3.199  3.297  Yes 
  Age  3.542  3.654  Yes 
  Household Size  2.821  2.785  Yes 
2008  Income  3.106  3.207  Yes 
  Education  3.177  3.254  Yes 
  Age  3.835  3.847  No 
  Household Size  2.745  2.725  No 
 




Appendix: Full results 
Table 2a
31
2007-2008: Grouping at DMA, income, education, household size, and age level 
 
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  Telephone  Television  Broadband 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVarAvgt-1  0.184743**  0.012256  0.169289**  0.009366  0.161881**  0.012196 
BundleAvgt-1  -0.00271  0.005634  0.005715  0.006959  0.015415+  0.008615 
AllThreeAvgt-1  -0.00083  0.004787  -0.00572  0.006514  -0.00442  0.011733 
H.S. Degree  0.031639**  0.008357  0.030035*  0.012122  0.052206**  0.012314 
Some College  0.026716**  0.008534  0.024572*  0.012169  0.115226**  0.012543 
College 
Degree  0.025871**  0.008909  0.021586+  0.012777  0.161089**  0.013365 
Graduate 
Degree  0.02432**  0.009052  0.005992  0.013244  0.182179**  0.013965 
25K – 49K  0.013615**  0.005179  0.076249**  0.007249  0.11976**  0.007983 
50K – 69K  0.020832**  0.005788  0.111985**  0.007993  0.205497**  0.009202 
70K – 99K  0.032056**  0.005938  0.127622**  0.008338  0.254535**  0.009659 
100K+  0.032817**  0.005794  0.15292**  0.008387  0.305286**  0.009811 
HHSize = 2  0.028015**  0.004561  0.054422**  0.006802  0.057711**  0.007463 
HHSize = 3  0.049931**  0.005978  0.060279**  0.007858  0.067071**  0.009063 
HHSize = 4  0.065887**  0.006633  0.046224**  0.008548  0.094256**  0.009629 
HHSize = 5+  0.063574**  0.007757  0.00486  0.01059  0.072062**  0.01158 
Age 25-34  0.016397  0.010837  0.055796**  0.01085  0.029378*  0.011891 
Age 35-44  0.103589**  0.009816  0.067976**  0.010288  -0.00351  0.011372 
Age 45-54  0.142697**  0.009536  0.063159**  0.010154  -0.03987**  0.011294 
Age 55-64  0.172129**  0.009792  0.07209**  0.010614  -0.06938**  0.012044 
Age 65+  0.202174**  0.009896  0.054361**  0.010956  -0.18477**  0.012391 
Constant  0.5379416**  0.0570953  0.41688**  0.0987719  0.1745673+  0.1033812 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.104  0.068  0.198 
Observations  34070  34070  34070 
 
   
                                                           
31 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 






2007-2008: Grouping at DMA, income, education, household size, and age level 
 
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  TelephoneCableCo  TelevisionCableCo  BroadbandCableCo 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVarAvgt-1  0.149843**  0.012478  0.184701**  0.0079  0.156389**  0.009327 
BundleAvgt-1  0.013511+  0.008183  -0.0111  0.009751  0.022765*  0.009355 
AllThreeAvgt-1  0.00414  0.005727  -0.00444  0.008365  0.011664  0.007726 
H.S. Degree  0.001801  0.008936  0.021702  0.013916  0.014059  0.009877 
Some College  0.004216  0.009014  0.026383+  0.014011  0.042288**  0.010164 
College 
Degree  0.005141  0.009834  0.046399**  0.014942  0.058298**  0.011361 
Graduate 
Degree  -0.0158  0.010445  0.044881**  0.015779  0.056733**  0.012398 
25K – 49K  0.012686*  0.005374  0.024823**  0.008346  0.054894**  0.006607 
50K – 69K  0.023149**  0.006571  0.044237**  0.009697  0.091858**  0.008202 
70K – 99K  0.037721**  0.007287  0.055509**  0.01043  0.122394**  0.009099 
100K+  0.037279**  0.00751  0.08036**  0.010693  0.163272**  0.009487 
HHSize = 2  0.022957**  0.005263  -0.00421  0.008086  0.023943**  0.006643 
HHSize = 3  0.039052**  0.006717  0.004533  0.009858  0.036446**  0.008621 
HHSize = 4  0.0428**  0.007508  -0.02325*  0.0108  0.036856**  0.009653 
HHSize = 5+  0.043541**  0.009078  -0.03784**  0.012684  0.033802**  0.011519 
Age 25-34  0.022538*  0.008961  -0.00984  0.013049  0.012159  0.0125 
Age 35-44  0.036501**  0.008649  -0.00214  0.012398  -0.02818*  0.011826 
Age 45-54  0.030252**  0.008479  0.005838  0.012205  -0.0471**  0.011627 
Age 55-64  0.038982**  0.009026  0.01005  0.012941  -0.06467**  0.012229 
Age 65+  0.024735**  0.008981  0.009298  0.013117  -0.10362**  0.012196 
Constant  0.0486289  0.074471  0.1696456+  0.1027844  0.2610282*  0.1035324 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.056  0.065  0.093 
Observations  34070  34070  34070 
 
   
                                                           
32 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 






2008-2009: Grouping at DMA, income, education, household size, and age level 
 
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  Telephone  Television  Broadband 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVarAvgt-1  0.256198**  0.01344  0.201352**  0.011716  0.22366**  0.012296 
BundleAvgt-1  0.009231  0.006851  0.022288**  0.007904  0.007229  0.00844 
AllThreeAvgt-1  -0.00521  0.006628  0.015384+  0.008463  -0.02083+  0.011121 
H.S. Degree  0.01118  0.009937  0.05857**  0.014794  0.128468**  0.013283 
Some College  0.003499  0.010262  0.071719**  0.014866  0.239823**  0.013571 
College 
Degree  -0.00456  0.010855  0.059982**  0.015578  0.288146**  0.014347 
Graduate 
Degree  -0.00242  0.011231  0.057642**  0.016173  0.282492**  0.015009 
25K – 49K  0.006884  0.006814  0.080198**  0.008895  0.112681**  0.009138 
50K – 69K  0.028871**  0.007734  0.110918**  0.010002  0.165686**  0.010477 
70K – 99K  0.036531**  0.007825  0.142516**  0.010034  0.204497**  0.010642 
100K+  0.042331**  0.007733  0.15639**  0.010199  0.24983**  0.010749 
HHSize = 2  0.030155**  0.00607  0.061682**  0.008299  0.051536**  0.008282 
HHSize = 3  0.046956**  0.007505  0.059547**  0.009485  0.037436**  0.009673 
HHSize = 4  0.065903**  0.008208  0.053327**  0.010114  0.059488**  0.010111 
HHSize = 5+  0.067494**  0.009701  0.023397+  0.01209  0.058173**  0.011795 
Age 25-34  0.001823  0.013037  0.085986**  0.013079  0.029311*  0.012311 
Age 35-44  0.123842**  0.011896  0.082094**  0.012469  0.005295  0.01177 
Age 45-54  0.169557**  0.011659  0.091013**  0.012448  -0.04066**  0.011965 
Age 55-64  0.198619**  0.011975  0.104818**  0.012951  -0.08148**  0.012723 
Age 65+  0.236294**  0.012047  0.083198**  0.013348  -0.17468**  0.013301 
Constant  0.4127478**  0.1169038  0.4244421**  0.1343661  0.0476034  0.1340459 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.140  0.083  0.239 
Observations  25668  25668  25668 
 
   
                                                           
33 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 






2008-2009: Grouping at DMA, income, education, household size, and age level 
 
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  TelephoneCableCo  TelevisionCableCo  BroadbandCableCo 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVarAvgt-1  0.183547**  0.012094  0.203363**  0.008644  0.201266**  0.00975 
BundleAvgt-1  0.035604**  0.00851  0.022013*  0.010114  0.005973  0.009715 
AllThreeAvgt-1  0.005201  0.006747  0.00017  0.009462  0.007187  0.00869 
H.S. Degree  0.002358  0.010975  0.056671**  0.014957  0.044154**  0.010512 
Some College  0.00457  0.011123  0.066241**  0.015154  0.084625**  0.010981 
College 
Degree  -0.00849  0.011991  0.082266**  0.016289  0.126751**  0.012471 
Graduate 
Degree  -0.00989  0.012879  0.09468**  0.017367  0.133533**  0.01382 
25K – 49K  0.015356*  0.006643  0.030458**  0.009483  0.050205**  0.007782 
50K – 69K  0.019491*  0.008068  0.046574**  0.011185  0.077969**  0.009748 
70K – 99K  0.043207**  0.008617  0.068655**  0.011641  0.116049**  0.010325 
100K+  0.041545**  0.008999  0.077628**  0.012008  0.143395**  0.010758 
HHSize = 2  0.026891**  0.006524  0.006171  0.009285  0.019039*  0.007919 
HHSize = 3  0.027473**  0.007943  -0.00584  0.011018  0.005346  0.009769 
HHSize = 4  0.039426**  0.008706  -0.02402*  0.011786  0.012727  0.010729 
HHSize = 5+  0.038727**  0.010163  -0.04414**  0.013609  -0.00073  0.012475 
Age 25-34  0.033192**  0.010112  0.032806*  0.014472  0.025512+  0.01381 
Age 35-44  0.035138**  0.009554  0.010123  0.013695  -0.02399+  0.013005 
Age 45-54  0.053312**  0.00978  0.045542**  0.01381  -0.03723**  0.01299 
Age 55-64  0.049081**  0.010332  0.03032*  0.014593  -0.07894**  0.013563 
Age 65+  0.055081**  0.010441  0.007303  0.014782  -0.11038**  0.013568 
Constant  -0.0176373  0.1119977  0.1826995  0.1565165  0.1630899  0.1363424 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.073  0.075  0.115 
Observations  25668  25668  25668 
 
   
                                                           
34 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 






2007-2008: NN by DMA, income, education, household size, and age level 
 
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  Telephone  Television  Broadband 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVart-1  0.083544**  0.005228  0.068013**  0.005124  0.067105**  0.007489 
Bundlet-1  -0.00159  0.003332  0.001374  0.004367  0.008327  0.005189 
AllThreet-1  0.000666  0.003005  0.002109  0.00412  -0.00672  0.007369 
H.S. Degree  0.031908**  0.005862  0.043825**  0.007678  0.079597**  0.009125 
Some College  0.024179**  0.005843  0.035226**  0.007653  0.150358**  0.009106 
College 
Degree  0.018391**  0.006283  0.028118**  0.008233  0.208529**  0.009802 
Graduate 
Degree  0.019309**  0.006777  0.013057  0.008883  0.225605**  0.010577 
25K – 49K  0.016787**  0.003946  0.087205**  0.005176  0.123007**  0.006141 
50K – 69K  0.029842**  0.00451  0.126169**  0.005916  0.210987**  0.007022 
70K – 99K  0.041538**  0.004808  0.152183**  0.006308  0.266498**  0.007485 
100K+  0.040387**  0.004958  0.173348**  0.006507  0.316723**  0.00772 
HHSize = 2  0.033737**  0.003988  0.058865**  0.005226  0.077471**  0.006207 
HHSize = 3  0.055674**  0.004645  0.065067**  0.006081  0.09272**  0.007226 
HHSize = 4  0.071764**  0.005031  0.05087**  0.00658  0.116814**  0.00782 
HHSize = 5+  0.063856**  0.005706  0.00379  0.007467  0.105043**  0.008873 
Age 25-34  0.019886**  0.005821  0.053746**  0.007624  0.030638**  0.009059 
Age 35-44  0.123518**  0.005559  0.064164**  0.007261  -0.0068  0.008641 
Age 45-54  0.161678**  0.005495  0.060612**  0.007157  -0.04086**  0.008529 
Age 55-64  0.19543**  0.0058  0.073015**  0.00753  -0.07845**  0.008988 
Age 65+  0.229752**  0.00595  0.050879**  0.007681  -0.20071**  0.0092 
Constant  0.5863374**  0.041823  0.4739165**  0.0546565  0.2486567**  0.0648644 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.095  0.057  0.176 
Observations  47698  47698  47698 
 
   
                                                           
35 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 






2007-2008: NN by DMA, income, education, household size, and age level 
 
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  TelephoneCableCo  TelevisionCableCo  BroadbandCableCo 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVart-1  0.056902**  0.006238  0.072685**  0.004751  0.062294**  0.005181 
Bundlet-1  0.004778  0.004703  -0.00243  0.005717  0.008903+  0.005181 
AllThreet-1  0.004626  0.003488  -7.3E-05  0.005081  0.007473  0.004644 
H.S. Degree  0.008996  0.007049  0.027639**  0.010048  0.030183**  0.009 
Some College  0.013084+  0.007025  0.034608**  0.010014  0.064097**  0.008972 
College 
Degree  0.014915*  0.007554  0.062243**  0.010768  0.089904**  0.009648 
Graduate 
Degree  -0.00118  0.008149  0.060632**  0.011614  0.093796**  0.010408 
25K–49K  0.011371*  0.004744  0.029566**  0.006762  0.055886**  0.006057 
50K–69K  0.02401**  0.005422  0.04889**  0.007728  0.10264**  0.006923 
70K–99K  0.038195**  0.00578  0.072475**  0.008238  0.136438**  0.007381 
100K+  0.040405**  0.005962  0.094946**  0.008498  0.171336**  0.007619 
HHSize = 2  0.02234**  0.004795  -0.00482  0.006837  0.034358**  0.006123 
HHSize = 3  0.035454**  0.005583  0.000495  0.007963  0.045787**  0.007128 
HHSize = 4  0.041476**  0.006041  -0.0253**  0.008621  0.048786**  0.007714 
HHSize = 5+  0.042779**  0.006854  -0.04922**  0.009782  0.045882**  0.008751 
Age 25-34  0.013073+  0.006999  -0.02178*  0.009977  0.000522  0.008937 
Age 35-44  0.020276**  0.006665  -0.01833+  0.009502  -0.04108**  0.00851 
Age 45-54  0.020604**  0.006569  -0.00065  0.009364  -0.05628**  0.00839 
Age 55-64  0.026865**  0.006911  0.002004  0.009852  -0.07654**  0.00883 
Age 65+  0.012261+  0.00705  0.001599  0.010049  -0.12353**  0.009013 
Constant  0.0160156  0.0501062  0.3075835**  0.0714284  0.1516641*  0.063978 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.047  0.054  0.083 
Observations  47698  47698  47698 
 
   
                                                           
36 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 






2008-2009: NN by DMA, income, education, household size, and age level 
 
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  Telephone  Television  Broadband 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVart-1  0.117952**  0.006447  0.087545**  0.006561  0.094963**  0.007817 
Bundlet-1  0.001478  0.004201  0.006919  0.005178  0.002114  0.005292 
AllThreet-1  -0.00239  0.004247  0.008331  0.005361  -0.0065  0.007475 
H.S. Degree  0.011193  0.007945  0.047568**  0.009744  0.127397**  0.010009 
Some College  -0.00215  0.007937  0.059664**  0.009737  0.242401**  0.010011 
College 
Degree  -0.01219  0.008492  0.047868**  0.010417  0.303912**  0.010729 
Graduate 
Degree  -0.00705  0.0091  0.034008**  0.011167  0.30956**  0.011501 
25K – 49K  0.015417**  0.005385  0.095959**  0.006608  0.12044**  0.006792 
50K – 69K  0.037308**  0.006203  0.134826**  0.007613  0.177358**  0.00783 
70K – 99K  0.046041**  0.006359  0.167109**  0.007805  0.218399**  0.008034 
100K+  0.056643**  0.006511  0.186777**  0.007992  0.263231**  0.008224 
HHSize = 2  0.038351**  0.00548  0.062549**  0.00672  0.059941**  0.006901 
HHSize = 3  0.060096**  0.006217  0.057466**  0.00762  0.054285**  0.007827 
HHSize = 4  0.080563**  0.006594  0.051832**  0.008079  0.074332**  0.008298 
HHSize = 5+  0.07592**  0.007277  0.0199*  0.008924  0.064036**  0.009163 
Age 25-34  0.022818**  0.007337  0.089127**  0.008999  0.025089**  0.009242 
Age 35-44  0.163164**  0.007058  0.087493**  0.008622  -0.00345  0.008867 
Age 45-54  0.212004**  0.007121  0.093981**  0.008664  -0.05409**  0.008924 
Age 55-64  0.245225**  0.00756  0.111023**  0.009167  -0.10058**  0.009462 
Age 65+  0.290423**  0.007803  0.076278**  0.009394  -0.21166**  0.009739 
Constant  0.2860116**  0.0698106  0.4750731**  0.0855205  0.2318432**  0.0877831 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.123  0.066  0.209 
Observations  36194  36194  36194 
 
   
                                                           
37 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 






2008-2009: NN by DMA, income, education, household size, and age level 
 
Covariates  Dependent Variable 
  TelephoneCableCo  TelevisionCableCo  BroadbandCableCo 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
DepVart-1  0.084987**  0.006466  0.087571**  0.005424  0.086076**  0.005726 
Bundlet-1  0.01531**  0.005231  0.009568  0.006187  0.005879  0.005818 
AllThreet-1  -0.00023  0.004363  0.003065  0.005935  0.002774  0.005461 
H.S. Degree  0.007017  0.008678  0.040342**  0.011628  0.044505**  0.01066 
Some College  0.011442  0.00867  0.055949**  0.011618  0.090605**  0.010651 
College 
Degree  0.003739  0.009275  0.079965**  0.012427  0.139486**  0.011395 
Graduate 
Degree  0.000692  0.009941  0.077806**  0.013318  0.143072**  0.012212 
25K – 49K  0.013042*  0.005881  0.037359**  0.00788  0.051908**  0.007226 
50K – 69K  0.021302**  0.006774  0.0624**  0.009078  0.085478**  0.008327 
70K – 99K  0.046252**  0.006946  0.083131**  0.009306  0.122573**  0.008539 
100K+  0.043917**  0.007112  0.104413**  0.009529  0.155758**  0.008746 
HHSize = 2  0.030181**  0.005983  -0.00113  0.00802  0.023205**  0.00735 
HHSize = 3  0.032889**  0.006785  -0.00997  0.009096  0.016568*  0.008336 
HHSize = 4  0.047734**  0.007194  -0.03748**  0.00965  0.012493  0.008838 
HHSize = 5+  0.045801**  0.007942  -0.03999**  0.010657  0.008841  0.009758 
Age 25-34  0.033392**  0.008013  0.014325  0.010738  0.018587+  0.009843 
Age 35-44  0.04224**  0.007677  -0.01223  0.010289  -0.03564**  0.009434 
Age 45-54  0.057178**  0.007715  0.027805**  0.010339  -0.05216**  0.009484 
Age 55-64  0.05465**  0.008161  0.022243*  0.010936  -0.08914**  0.010036 
Age 65+  0.058202**  0.008362  -0.0045  0.011206  -0.1308**  0.010289 
Constant  -0.0345563  0.0761003  0.2861494**  0.1019951  0.1453506  0.0934899 
DMA-level 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.057  0.058  0.097 
Observations  36194  36194  36194 
 
 
                                                           
38 ** is significant at 1% level; * is significant at 5% level; + is significant at 10% level.  Reported standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Results change trivially when errors are clustered by DMA. 